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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, l 
Respondent, * Case No. 920078 
v. : Priority No. 13 
VENUS ANN SHERARD, : 
Petitioner• i 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT 
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The questions presented for review are: 
1. Was the court of appeals obligated to consider, for 
the first time on appeal, the merits of petitioner's challenge to 
the adequacy of the voir dire concerning the prospective jurors' 
knowledge of the victim's family? 
2. Did the court of appeals properly conclude that the 
trial court's limitation of voir dire questions, concerning the 
prospective jurors' personal use of alcohol, did not curtail 
counsel's ability to intelligently use peremptory challenges or 
to detect juror bias? 
OPINION BELOW 
The opinion of the court of appeals is State v. 
Sherard, 818 P.2d 554 (Utah App. 1991), in which rehearing was 
denied on December 6, 1991. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of 
the court of appeals by a writ of certiorari under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5) (Supp. 1991). Respondent agrees that the 
instant petition was timely filed under rule 48(a) and (c), Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of any constitutional provisions, statutes 
and rules upon which respondent relies is included in the body of 
this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In 1987, petitioner, Venus Sherard, killed Ruby Kelly 
by stabbing her nine times with a knife during a street fight in 
front of twenty to thirty people (T. 146-49, 197-202, 221, 251, 
298-301, 321-326, 355-56, 383, 415-18, 523-24, 567-68). In 1989, 
petitioner was convicted of murder in the second degree, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990) 
(R. 245). Petitioner was sentenced to the statutory term of 
imprisonment and timely appealed (R. 252, 254). 
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. See 
State v, Sherard, 818 P.2d 554 (Utah App. 1991) (attached as 
Addendum A). Petitioner filed a petition for rehearing, to which 
the State was ordered to respond in part. The petition was 
denied (Order attached as Addendum B). 
The facts surrounding the murder are accurately stated 
in the opinion of the court of appeals. Sherard, 818 P.2d at 
556. Since the petition for writ of certiorari is limited to the 
adequacy of the jury voir dire, only facts relevant to those 
2 
issues will be discussed.1 
Petitioner was originally arrested on May 7, 1987 for 
Ruby Kelly's murder (R. 3, 15-16). Because several of the 
victim's relatives witnessed the stabbing, there were some 
initial concerns that a confrontation might result if petitioner 
was released from custody (R. 272 at 23-24, 29). But even 
petitioner's trial counsel recognized that this did not amount to 
"the kind of threat where people are going to drive themselves 
crazy trying to find her. We think it's more of a confrontation 
or immediate threat were she to have contact with these people or 
be easily available to them. We don't think physical harm is, or 
physical threat is going to be great in that situation" (R. 272 
at 29). Petitioner was released pretrial in September, 1987 (R. 
42-43). Three months later, petitioner violated the terms of the 
release and a bench warrant issued for her arrest. She was re-
arrested in September, 1988 (R. 63-64, 71, 74). There is no 
evidence that any threats or confrontations occurred during the 
intervening period. Nor, is there any record support that the 
1987 pretrial concerns for petitioner's safety existed in 1988, 
1
 Despite petitioner's determination to only challenge the 
adequacy of the jury voir dire, she attempts to reargue the facts 
supporting her conviction by alleging: "The Sherard opinion is 
irreconcilable with the record in respect to the events transpiring 
immediately prior to the first and second fights between Ruby Kelly 
and Venus Sherard." See Petition for Certiorari at 3. See also 
Petition at 2-4, for similar allegations. These characterizations 
of the facts should be disregarded as irrelevant to any arguments 
advanced in seeking certiorari. 
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at the time of her re-arrest, or 1989, the date of trial.2 
Prior to her original trial date in 1987, petitioner 
filed a motion for counsel-conducted voir dire (R. 22). The 
motion was denied "without prejudice" but never renewed (Supp. R. 
272 at 19). After her re-arrest and prior to the 1989 trial, 
petitioner filed thirty-four (34) requests for jury voir dire 
questions (R. 97-103). Pertinent to the pending petition, 
petitioner initially requested: 
18. Do you know the alleged victim in this 
case, Ruby Kelly or her close friends or 
family? How do you know them? Have any of 
them ever discussed this case with you? 
19. Do you know the defendant, VENUS ANN 
SHERARD, or her family or close friends? How 
do you know them? Have any of them ever 
discussed this charge with you? 
20. Do you know any of the witnesses listed 
in this case? How do you know them? Have 
they ever discussed this matter with you? If 
the witness you know were to testify, would 
you be inclined to believe that person 
because of your knowledge about them? 
(R. 99). Four days later, petitioner withdrew these questions 
2
 Petitioner asserts that the case was difficult to 
investigate because the victim's "associates were threatening the 
witnesses." See Petition for Certiorari at 3. Petitioner then 
footnotes the statement to refer to the trial court's single 
admonition to the audience during trial to be quiet (R. 466) as 
being an example of how "people extraneous to the actual trial may 
have attempted to influence . . . the trial." See Petition for 
Certiorari at 3 n.l. Both statements are distortions of the 
record. One officer testified that some of the witnesses, many of 
whom were gang members or relatives of gang members, were 
"hesitant" to talk to the police (T. 110). Similarly, the court's 
admonition to the audience to be quiet was not directed at any 
specific individuals but simply exemplified "that many in the 
courtroom are emotionally committed to the effects of this offense 
from whichever side they may come"(R. 631). 
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and substituted the following, in pertinent part: 
1. Do any of you know the defendant VENUS 
SHERARD, her family, or Ruby Kelly's family? 
2. Do any of you know of the defendant, 
VENUS SHERARD, her family or Ruby Kelly's 
family through your family or friends? 
(R. 160).3 
As petitioner conceded on appeal (Br. of Appellant at 
19-23), the trial court conducted an extensive voir dire. The 
questioning substantially incorporated petitioner's requests as 
well as sua sponte inquiries. It primarily involved in-court 
examination but included in-chamber inquiries as required or as 
requested by any potential juror (T. 3-68). All of petitioner's 
challenges for cause were granted by the court (T. 61-68). 
Relative to petitioner's proposed questions concerning 
knowledge of the victim or her family, the court asked counsel to 
introduce themselves, petitioner, and their respective witnesses 
(T. 16-17). Among the witnesses were Vikki Salazar, the victim's 
cousin (T. 18-19, 455), Vikki's brother, Jeff Salazar, 
presumptively another cousin of the victim's (T. 16-18, 283), and 
Vikki's nephew, Todd Kingston, presumptively a second cousin of 
the victim's (T. 16-18, 339). The court asked if any of the jury 
panel were "acquainted" with these witnesses (T. 17). None of 
3
 On appeal, petitioner characterized these proposed questions 
as "concerning the relationships or contact between prospective 
jurors and Ruby Kelly's family." See Br. of Appellant at 19 and 
Petition for Certiorari at 11 (emphasis added). While the court of 
appeals incorporated that language, a more accurate 
characterization of the questions is that they concerned the 
prospective jurors' knowledge of the victim and her relatives. 
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the jurors indicated that they were (T. 19). The panel was asked 
if they were "familiar" with the victim, Ruby Kelly. Again, all 
responded negatively (T. 21). 
Despite these direct questions and unanimously negative 
responses, a potential juror, Manuel Martinez, subsequently 
approached the court because he thought he "may be familiar with 
some of the parties in this case" (T. 58). Mr. Martinez was then 
questioned in-chambers. He admitted that while he had previously 
denied being "acquainted" or "familiar" with the witnesses and 
victim, he was actually "real good friends" with Anthony and Max 
Kelly, two of Ruby's brothers, and that his wife's sister-in-law 
was Vikki Salazar (T. 58-59). The court removed Mr. Martinez for 
cause (T. 62, 64-65).A 
No further requests concerning the potential jurors' 
knowledge of the victim and her family were made; nor, were any 
exceptions taken to the scope of the inquiries made in this 
regard (T. 65-67). Based on the record, the court of appeals 
concluded that petitioner had failed to properly preserve the 
issue for appeal. Sherard. 818 P.2d at 558. 
Petitioner also attacks the court of appeals' review of 
the trial court's limitation on voir dire questions concerning 
the potential jurors' personal consumption of alcohol. Pretrial, 
A
 Again, petitioner attempts to distort this incident by 
characterizing it as "[a]n additional incident [which] brought the 
threat posed by the Kellys to the trial court's attention." See 
Petition for Certiorari at 6. There is no record support for the 
claim (T. 58-59). All that the incident demonstrates is the 
obvious problem which exists in any voir dire if potential jurors 
are not honest and candid in their responses. 
6 
petitioner requested that the jurors be asked: 
30. Are there any of you who do not 
drink alcoholic beverages? If so, have you 
ever drunk alcoholic beverages in the past? 
For those who do not drink alcoholic 
beverages, do you believe it is wrong for 
moral or religious reasons? Would testimony 
that a person was drinking in this case cause 
you to feel less favorable about that 
person's credibility? 
(R. 102-03). During the voir dire, the trial court inquired: 
There may be evidence during the course of 
this case that there were alcoholic beverages 
being consumed by the defendant, the victim 
and maybe others in their surroundings. Do 
any of you believe that it is simply morally 
wrong to consume alcoholic beverages in all 
cases and under all circumstances, if so , 
would you raise your hand? 
(T. 38). The court also asked the jurors if there existed any 
undisclosed factors which could impact their verdicts (T. 67). 
To both questions, the court received negative responses (T. 38, 
67). At the close of voir dire, petitioner's trial counsel 
requested that the jurors be asked "whether the alcohol is drunk 
by members of the jury as a practice" (T. 66). The court 
declined to so inquire. 
On appeal, petitioner claimed that the trial court's 
failure to ask about the personal consumption practices of the 
jury panel constituted an abuse of discretion. The court of 
appeals rejected this argument, concluding that the voir dire, 
when taken as a whole, adequately allowed for the detection of 
bias and the intelligent use of peremptory challenges. Sherard, 
818 P.2d at 559. 
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ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION TO 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
POINT I 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY DECLINED TO 
ADDRESS, FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, 
PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO THE VOIR DIRE 
QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE JURORS' KNOWLEDGE OF 
THE VICTIM'S RELATIVES. 
Petitioner concedes that she did not take exception or 
otherwise object at trial to any claimed deficiencies in the voir 
dire concerning the potential jurors' knowledge of the victim's 
relatives. See Petition for Certiorari at 11. Despite this, 
petitioner asserts that the court of appeals improperly applied 
civil procedure cases in determining waiver and impermissibly 
failed to rule on petitioner's "plain error" argument. Neither 
contention provides a basis for proper certiorari review. 
An appellate court "need not analyze and address in 
writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised and 
properly before [it]. Rather, it is a maxim of appellate review 
that the nature and extent of an opinion rendered by an appellate 
court is largely discretionary with that court." State v. 
Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989). Further, a written 
opinion need not "'set forth and dispose of, seriatim, each and 
every item which appellant's counsel chooses to characterize as 
an 'issue' in the case.'" Id. (quoting People v. Roias, 118 Cal. 
App. 3d 278, 290, 174 Cal. Rptr. 91, 92-93 (Cal. App. 1981)). 
Consistent with the established rule, the court of appeals did 
not directly respond to petitioner's argument that her failure to 
object below would not preclude appellate review under a "plain 
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error11 analysis. For, the "plain error" doctrine does not 
mandate an appellate court to consider any issue which has not 
been properly preserved. State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 
(Utah 1990). Instead, an appellate court may exercise its 
discretion to correct a trial court error, despite a lack of 
objection, where the error is both obvious and harmful. State v. 
Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 36 (Utah), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 62 
(1989). Here, petitioner thoroughly briefed and orally argued 
the merits of her "plain error" argument to the court of appeals. 
Under these circumstances, the court's omission of the argument 
from its written opinion implicitly demonstrates the court's 
conclusion that no plain and prejudicial error existed. As to 
the first prong of "obviousness," petitioner did not establish 
why it was not reasonable for the trial court to assume that it 
had covered the scope of defendant's request when it asked the 
jurors if they were "acquainted" with witnesses, who in fact were 
relatives of the victim, and asked if they were "familiar" with 
the victim, especially where other names of relatives were 
supplied to the trial court and no exceptions taken to the scope 
of the questions asked. Regarding the second prong of 
"prejudice," petitioner has never alleged that any relative of 
the victim sat on the jury empaneled. See Utah R. Crim. P. 
18(e)(3) (allowing a challenge for cause to be predicated on 
"consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to the person 
alleged to be injured"). Without a showing that one of the 
jurors who adjudicated petitioner's case could have been removed 
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for cause, prejudicial error may not be found• Mu'Min v. 
Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (1991) (peremptory challenges are 
not required by the federal constitution); State v. Gotschall, 
782 P.2d 459, 461 (Utah 1989) (prejudicial error may occur if a 
party is forced to "exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a 
prospective juror who should have been removed for 
cause"). Accord State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988) 
(even where a voir dire issue has been preserved, "an appellant 
has the burden of establishing that reversible error resulted 
from an abuse of discretion"). 
Petitioner's second contention is that the court of 
appeals improperly relied on civil rules of procedure, to the 
exclusion of criminal rules, in concluding that petitioner had 
failed to preserve the voir dire issue. See Petition for 
Certiorari at 12. However, it is clear from the opinion that 
the court relied on the principles exemplified in rule 20, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require a party in a criminal 
case to timely state its objections to any actions of the trial 
court. Sherard, 818 P.2d at 558. This is consistent with rule 
18(c)(2), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which specifies that 
any challenge to a prospective juror "may be made only before the 
jury is sworn to action." It is also consistent with the clear 
rulings of this Court that a party in a criminal case has the 
obligation to timely object to the adequacy of the voir dire in a 
manner calculated to inform the trial court of the error and to 
permit any appropriate correction. State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 
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81, 83 (Utah 1988) (ruling that to preserve voir dire issues, a 
defendant must timely object under rule 18 or face waiver on 
appeal under rule 12); State v. Moton, 749 P.2d 639, 642 (Utah 
1988) (under rules 18 and 12, defendant's failure to challenge a 
prospective juror or request further inquiry into her alleged 
bias constituted waiver which could not be "attributable to the 
trial court's failure to do so of its own accord"); State v. 
Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986) (failure to follow 
procedural requirement of lodging challenge before jury is sworn 
constituted waiver); State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 
1983) (even when the court "forgets" to ask an otherwise proper 
voir dire question concerning bias, failure to conform to rule 18 
by "object[ing], remind[ing] the judge of the oversight, 
mak[ing] a new request, [or] ask[ing] permission personally to 
voir dire the jury" constituted waiver under rule 12). Accord 
Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Apps. 1989), cert, denied, 
800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) (failure to ask an otherwise proper 
voir dire question constitutes waiver under the general 
procedural requirement that "to preserve a question for appeal, 
an objection must be clear and concise and made in 'a fashion 
calculated to obtain a ruling thereon'"); Broberg v. Hess, 782 
P.2d 198, 201 (Utah App. 1989) ("[a] specific objection to the 
failure to make a requested voir dire inquiry is required so that 
the trial court may correct its error before the jury is selected 
and empaneled;" thus, more is required to preserve the issue than 
merely filing pretrial written voir dire requests). See also 
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Keller v. Gerber, 114 Utah 345, 199 P.2d 562, 564-65 (1948) 
("whenever a litigant has a meritorious proposition of law which 
he is seriously pressing upon the attention of the trial court, 
he should raise that point in such clear and simple language that 
the trial court may not misunderstand it, and if his point is so 
obscurely hinted at that the trial court quite excusably may fail 
to grasp it, it will avail naught to disturb the judgment on 
appeal")• 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
IN LIMITING VOIR DIRE INQUIRY INTO THE 
ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION PRACTICES OF POTENTIAL 
JURORS• 
Petitioner argues that the court of appeals erroneously 
concluded that no error occurred when the trial court declined to 
inquire into the personal alcohol consumption practices of the 
individual potential jurors. Petitioner asserts that this 
Court's opinion in State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 1055 (Utah 1984) 
mandates a contrary conclusion. 
The Sherard decision is consistent with recent 
pronouncements of this Court and the federal supreme court. 
While a trial court has the responsibility of seating a fair and 
impartial jury, "a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its 
sound discretion. This is the rule in civil cases, and the same 
rule must be applied in criminal cases." Mu'min v. Virginia, 111 
S. Ct. at 1903-04 (citations omitted). Applying this logic, this 
12 
Court has similarly concluded: 
[N]o specific form of questioning need be 
followed in order for the voir dire to give a 
defendant his or her rights due under the 
constitution. The constitution does not 
require that jurors be questioned 
individually, by counsel in the case, or in 
any other particular arrangement. The manner 
and method of voir dire lies within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991). Accord Bishop, 753 
P.2d at 448 (the test is whether, given the totality of the voir 
dire questioning, "counsel was afforded an adequate opportunity 
to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors"). 
Here, petitioner has not advanced any basis from which 
to conclude that the issue of alcohol would bear in anyway on the 
ultimate issues at trial. While the stabbing occurred at a party 
where drinking was generally occurring, neither petitioner nor 
the witnesses testified that the use of alcohol contributed to 
the fight. Nor was petitioner's use of alcohol argued as a basis 
to negate her intent or to otherwise minimize her culpability. 
Instead, the issue at trial was whether the nine stab wounds 
inflicted by petitioner were done in self-defense or with 
homicidal intent. Under these circumstances, Ball is not 
factually dispositive. Instead, the court of appeals properly 
concluded that general references to the consumption of alcohol 
by a defendant or witness, do not establish a sufficient basis to 
justify "'an inquisition into the private beliefs and experiences 
of a venireman.'' Sherard, 818 P.2d at 559 (quoting State v. 
Ball, 685 P.2d at 1060). As such, the trial court had not abused 
13 
its discretion in limiting inquiry beyond that of the jurors' 
general attitudes toward the consumption of alcohol. Sherard, 
818 P.2d at 559. 
CONCLUSION 
Having failed to present any appropriate basis for 
certiorari review, the petition should be denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this *> day of March, 1992. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
--> 
IRlSTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Venus Ann Sherard, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
T.Noonan 
Cterk of the Court 
Utah Coim of Appeal 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No- 890383-CA 
F I L E D 
(September 10, 1991) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
Attorneys: James C. Bradshaw, Joan C. Watt, and Elizabeth 
Holbrook, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam and Christine F. Soltis, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon. 
RUSSON, Judge: 
Venus Ann Sherard appeals her conviction of criminal 
homicide, murder in the second degree, a first degree felony in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990). We affirm. 
FACTS 
We review the facts in the light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. State v. Pascual. 804 P.2d 553, 554 (Utah App. 
1991). 
At approximately 10:00 p.m. on March 7, 1987, Sherard, 
with friends, went to a party at Vikki Salazar's home. The 
party had started around 7:00 p.m. When Sherard arrived, about 
thirty to forty people were present, most of whom were drinking 
A short time after Sherard's arrival, Ruby Kelly, the 
victim in this case, arrived at the party with two friends, 
Kristi Bray and Tanya Benns. Sherard did not know Kelly, but 
did know Benns, who was a member of a rival gang. Benns began 
arguing with Sherard and others, and in response, Salazar 
asked Kelly and her friends to leave. Despite Salazar's 
protestations, Sherard offered to leave instead. 
When Sherard reached the front yard of Salazar's house, 
she met one of her friends whose face was bloody. The friend 
said that Kelly had hit her. In response, Sherard said that 
she wanted to fight Kelly, and subsequently a fight broke out 
between the two women. Kelly had the better of the fight, and 
eventually Sherard conceded. As Sherard walked away, Benns 
taunted her to continue the fight. According to one witness, 
Eloy Esquibel, before resuming the fight, Sherard asked him for 
a knife, which he gave her. Additionally, at least two 
witnesses heard someone shout that Sherard had a knife; another 
testified that he actually saw the knife in Sherard's hand. 
Sherard testified that Esquibel put "something" into her hand, 
which she did not look at, but believed was a knife. 
Sherard returned, and the fight resumed, moving into the 
street. According to several witnesses, Sherard delivered 
several uppercuts to Kelly's torso. Jeff Salazar, one witness 
to the fight, testified that he saw Sherard uppercut Kelly with 
the knife in her hand. Todd Kingston, another witness to the 
fight, testified that after the fight he took a knife from 
Sherard and threw it away; several other witnesses saw him do 
so. Additionally, Tommy Quintana, a friend of Sherard, 
testified that Sherard told him that she had stabbed Kelly. 
Kelly died from nine stab wounds. 
Sherard was subsequently tried by a jury and convicted of 
murder in the second degree. Sherard appeals that conviction, 
raising the following four points: (1) Was there sufficient 
evidence presented at trial to sustain her conviction for 
murder in the second degree? (2) Did the trial court abuse its 
discretion in limiting the voir dire of the prospective 
jurors? (3) Did the trial court properly deny her request for 
a jury instruction on negligent homicide? (4) Did the trial 
court commit reversible error in its instructions to the jury 
on self-defense and mutual combat? 
I. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
Sherard argues that the evidence presented at trial was 
insufficient to sustain a conviction for murder in the second 
o 
degree. On appeal, we review the evidence and reasonable 
inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the jury's 
verdict. State v. Harman. 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989) 
(citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). We do 
not weigh conflicting evidence, nor do we substitute our own 
judgment on the credibility of the witnesses for that of the 
jury. State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 477 (Utah 1989); £££ 
alSP State v, Lactod. 761 P.2d 23, 28 (Utah App. 1988). On 
appeal, we will reverse only if the evidence "is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds 
must have entertained a reasonable doubt1' that the defendant 
committed the crime of which she was convicted. State v. 
Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah 1989) (citations omitted); 
£££ also Petree, 659 P.2d at 444; State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 
903-04 (Utah App. 1990). 
1. Subsequent to the appeal in this case, another panel of 
this court clarified our marshaling requirement and applied it 
to criminal jury trials. State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 
(Utah App. 1990). Moore held that in order for an appellant's 
sufficiency of the evidence claim to be reviewed on the merits, 
the appellant must marshal the evidence in support of the 
jury's verdict and demonstrate that, even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict below. 
In the case at bar, Sherard has neither marshaled the 
evidence in support of the jury's verdict, nor shown that, in 
spite of this evidence, the verdict below is unsupportable. 
Appellant's brief contains no references whatsoever to the 
evidence presented at trial. In an apparent effort to respond 
to the marshaling requirement in Moore, appellant's reply brief 
contains a matrix that lists various witnesses and their 
testimony on a number of issues. However, upon examination, 
this matrix amounts to no more than an outline of transcript 
citations. The reply brief contains no indication as to what 
evidence supports the jury's verdict or what evidence opposes 
it, simply leaving it to us to decipher the chart. Nor does 
the reply brief contain any argument as to why the evidence is 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict in this case. In 
other words, Sherard has plainly failed to present a record for 
us to review for sufficiency. 
However, since Moore. by its own terms, is meant to apply 
only prospectively, i£l. at 739, and since this appeal was filed 
prior to the court's decision in Moore, we review Sherard's 
sufficiency of the evidence claim on the merits. 
The jury was instructed on second degree murder as follows: 
Before you can convict the defendant, 
Venus Ann Sherard, of the crime of Criminal 
Homicide - Murder in the Second Degree, as 
charged in the Information on file in this 
case, you must find from all of the 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of 
the following elements of that offense. 
1. That on or about the 7th day of 
March, 1987, in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the defendant, Venus Ann Sherard, 
caused the death of Ruby Kelly; and 
2. That said defendant then and 
there did so: (a) intentionally or 
knowingly; or (b) intending to cause 
serious bodily injury to another, she 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human 
life; or (c) knowingly acting under 
circumstances evidencing a depraved 
indifference to human life, she engaged in 
conduct which created a grave risk [of] 
death to another; 
3. That said defendant caused the 
death in an unlawful manner and without 
justification. 
If you are convinced of the truth of 
each and every one of the foregoing 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then 
you must find the defendant guilty of the 
offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the 
Second Degree as charged in the Information. 
If, on the other hand, you find that 
the State has failed to prove any of these 
elements beyond a reasonable doubt then you 
must find the defendant not guilty. 
Viewing the evidence and inferences therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict, it is sufficiently 
conclusive to support the said verdict. As to the first 
element, all witnesses* accounts of the fight support the 
conclusion that Sherard caused the death of Kelly. As to the 
second element, Sherard's own testimony that Eloy Esquibel gave 
her something -heavy and . . . real cold and real hard like 
metal or something,M which she believed was a knife, and that 
she punched Kelly with it numerous times, evidences, at the 
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very least, a depraved indifference to human life. This 
conclusion is further supported by the testimony of numerous 
witnesses who recounted Sherard's desire to fight Kelly, Eloy 
Esquibel's testimony that Sherard asked him for a knife before 
resuming the fight, and various witnesses' accounts of the 
second fight, including Jeff Salazar's testimony that he 
actually saw Sherard uppercut Kelly with a knife in her hand. 
As to the third element, although Sherard testified that she 
acted in self-defense, several witnesses testified that Sherard 
returned to Kelly and, without justification, resumed the 
fight. Given the amount of evidence which supports the State's 
case, we cannot say that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that Sherard was guilty of second degree 
murder, and therefore conclude that the evidence was sufficient 
to support the jury's verdict. 
II. VOIR DIRE 
Sherard next claims that the trial court erred in limiting 
the voir dire of the prospective jurors. Specifically, she 
objects to the extent of the trial court's inquiry as to: 
(1) the relationship or contact between prospective jurors and 
Ruby Kelly's family, (2) group affiliations, (3) experience 
with and attitude toward alcohol, (4) experience with and 
attitude toward violence, and (5) exposure to publicity. 
Voir dire exists to detect bias justifying a challenge for 
cause and to assist counsel in the intelligent use of 
peremptory challenges. Doe v. Hafen. 772 P.2d 456, 457 (Utah 
App.), cert, granted 789 P.2d 33 (Utah 1989) (citing State vt 
Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 844 (Utah 1983) and Hornsby v. 
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop, 758 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah 
App.), cert* denied Siih nom. Hornsbv v. LPS Church. 773 P.2d 45 
(Utah 1988)). The extent of voir dire is within the discretion 
of the trial judge, as long as counsel is given adequate 
information with which to evaluate prospective jurors. Id. 
Moreover, "whether the judge has abused that discretion is 
determined, not by considering isolated questions, but 
•considering the totality of the questioning.'" Xd. at 457-58 
(quoting State v. Bishop. 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988)). 
Sherard's first voir dire issue, concerning the 
relationship or contact between prospective jurors and Ruby 
Kelly's family, was not properly preserved for appeal. When 
asked to pass the jury for cause, defense counsel objected to 
the omission of several requested areas of inquiry, including 
the other matters raised on appeal herein. However, defense 
counsel did not object to the lack of inquiry into the 
relationship or contact between prospective jurors and Ruby 
Kelly's family. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 20 provides 
that counsel -state his objections to the actions of the court 
and the reasons therefor.- See also Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d at 
458. Since defense counsel failed to do so as to this issue, 
it was not properly preserved for appeal. 
Sherard1s second claim of inadequate voir dire, group 
affiliations of the prospective jurors, also fails. The two 
requested questions in this area that were not asked by the 
trial court were: 
Do you belong to any clubs or 
organizations? Which ones? 
What kinds of hobbies and leisure time 
activities do you enjoy? 
On appeal, Sherard claims that this area of inquiry would have 
revealed whether potential jurors could relate to the lifestyle 
of gang members or find such lifestyle opprobrious. However, 
she fails to support this blanket claim with any argument or 
analysis as to how either of the requested questions is 
probative of prospective jurors' opinions on the lifestyle of 
gang members. Moreover, this was never given as a reason for 
requesting these questions below. Since the trial courts have 
been instructed not to allow -inordinately extensive or 
unfocused questioning,- id. at 457, we find no abuse of 
discretion on behalf of the trial court in refusing to ask 
these questions either. 
On the issue of alcohol, the trial court asked the 
potential jurors: 
There may be evidence during the course 
of this case that there were alcoholic 
beverages being consumed by the 
defendant, the victim and maybe others in 
their surroundings. Do any of you 
believe that it is simply morally wrong 
to consume alcoholic beverages in all 
cases and under all circumstances, if so, 
would you raise your hand? 
£ 
There were no affirmative responses to this question. Sherard 
claims that this question was insufficient because it failed to 
address potential jurors* attitudes toward and experiences with 
alcohol. As to the former, we are of the opinion that this is 
precisely the sort of question which is designed to elicit 
potential jurors' attitudes toward alcohol. As to the latter, 
it is the trial court's duty to "protect juror privacy." State 
v. Ball. 685 P.2d 1055, 1060 (Utah 1984). To that end, it is 
the trial court's duty to forbid defense counsel to "conduct an 
inquisition into the private beliefs and experiences of a 
venireman." Ifl. On the facts of this case, it was sufficient 
for the trial court to inquire on the attitudes of the 
potential jurors as to alcohol, without specifically inquiring 
as to their experiences with it. Accordingly, we find no abuse 
of discretion on this matter. 
Next, Sherard complains as to the inadequacy of 
investigation into the potential jurors' experiences with and 
attitudes toward violence. With respect to this issue, the 
trial court asked four questions: "[H]ave any of you been 
involved in a fist fight before?"; "Have any of you been in a 
fist fight or in a fight where weapons have been used?"; 
"[Have] any of you [] been witnesses to a serious injury as a 
result of a fight involving weapons . . . ?"; and "Do any of 
you believe that there is no circumstance or that it is morally 
wrong to be in a fight at all situations . . . ?" Taken as a 
whole, these questions were designed to and did elicit 
responses on the prospective jurors' experiences with and 
attitudes toward violence. Thus, the trial court's refusal to 
inquire further was not an abuse of discretion. 
The final issue with regard to voir dire is Sherard's 
claim that the jurors were not adequately questioned as to 
their exposure to publicity. The judge conducted the following 
inquiry: 
Have any of you heard anything about this 
case, if so, would you raise your hand? 
You can say yes or no to the question. 
Have you heard about this case? 
All right. Would your familiarity with 
the reporting cause you any reason to 
believe you could not be fair and 
impartial in this case? 
If you read something in the newspaper 
would you be caused to believe that this 
would be true simply because it's in the 
newspaper? 
If you heard testimony here in conflict 
with that which you read in the newspaper 
would you be willing to follow that which 
you believed from the courtroom that you 
heard in testimony rather than that which 
you read in the newspaper? 
Sherard's objection to exposure to pre-trial publicity concerns 
the court's failure to ask about specific magazines which the 
jurors read or to which they subscribed. However, defense 
counsel presented no argument to connect specific magazines 
with pre-trial publicity below, nor does counsel present such 
argument here. It is abundantly clear that the questions 
asked, in fact, revealed more about jurors' familiarity with 
pre-trial publicity than a vague question about specific 
magazines subscribed to and read could possibly have elicited. 
Therefore, again we find no abuse of discretion.. 
In conclusion, the trial court's decision to limit voir 
dire did not prevent detection of bias, nor did it limit 
defense counsel's ability to intelligently use peremptory 
challenges. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the 
limitation of voir dire by the trial court in this case. 
III. NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE 
Sherard next asserts that the trial court erred in failing 
to give her requested jury instruction on negligent homicide. 
We review a trial court's refusal to give a requested 
instruction under a correction of error standard, granting no 
particular deference to the trial court's ruling. Carpet Barn 
v. Department of Transp., 786 P.2d 770, 775 (Utah App.), cert. 
denied 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990) (citing Ramon v. Farr, 770 
P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 19t9)). 
Although "a defendant's requested lesser included offense 
must be given when there is some evidence which supports the 
theory asserted by defendant,H State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 
254, 266 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 152, 
157-59 (Utah 1983)), there must also be a w•rational basis for 
a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and 
convicting [her] of the included offense.•" State v. Larocco, 
794 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1990) (quoting fiflJifiJL, 671 P.2d at 
159). Thus, we must examine: (1) if there is sufficient 
evidence to support Sherard1s request for a negligent homicide 
instruction, and (2) whether there is a rational basis for a 
verdict acquitting Sherard of murder in the second degree and 
manslaughter, on which the jury was also instructed, but still 
convicting her of negligent homicide. 
Negligent homicide and reckless manslaughter are related 
concepts, both requiring that defendants conduct be M,a gross 
deviation1 from the standard of care exercised by an ordinary 
person.- Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267. The only difference is 
that manslaughter requires that the defendant was actually 
aware of the risk of death, while in negligent homicide, the 
defendant was not, but should have been aware of such risk. 
I£. (citing Boooess v. State. 655 P.2d 654, 656-58 (Utah 1982) 
(Stewart, J., concurring)). 
Our review of the evidence indicates that Sherard1s 
request for a negligent homicide instruction is unsupportable. 
Sherard's own testimony was that Eloy Esquibel gave her 
something "heavy and . . . real cold and real hard like metal 
or something," which she believed was a knife, and that she 
punched Kelly with it several times. Additionally, after the 
fight, she told Tommy Quintana, "I stabbed her, I think I 
stabbed her." This testimony is inconsistent with negligent 
manslaughter's requirement that the defendant be unaware of the 
risks associated with her conduct. In fact, Sherard offers no 
evidence from which a jury could conclude that she was unaware 
of the risks involved. Without such evidence, we cannot 
justify an instruction on negligent homicide. 
Moreover, as noted in Section I above, the evidence 
presented at trial was sufficient to convict Sherard of the 
greater offense, second degree murder. We, therefore, find 
that there was no rational basis for a verdict acquitting 
Sherard of second degree murder and manslaughter and convicting 
her of negligent homicide. 
Lastly, in Standiford, the Utah Supreme Court, on similar 
facts, held that -since the jury convicted of second degree 
murder despite the fact that an instruction was given on the 
lesser included offense of manslaughter, failure to give a 
negligent homicide instruction was, at very best, harmless 
error.- Standiford, 769 P.2d at 267, Accordingly, we hold 
that the trial court did not err in refusing to instruct the 
jury on negligent homicide. 
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Sherard also contends that the trial court committed 
reversible error in instructing the jury on self-defense and 
mutual combat. Specifically, she argues that one of the 
instructions concerning self-defense erroneously stated that 
the test of the reasonableness of her actions was an objective, 
not subjective, test; and that the mutual combat instruction 
was irrelevant and confusing. 
-[B]eyond the substantive scope, correctness, and clarity 
of the jury instructions, their precise wording and specificity 
is left to the sound discretion of the trial court.- State v. 
My/ 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted). 
However, the said instructions must not incorrectly or 
misleadingly state material rules of law. Id-
Sherard argues that Jury Instruction Number 26 erroneously 
stated that self-defense is governed by an objective, not 
subjective, standard. Instruction Number 26 reads: 
The reasonableness of a belief that 
a person is justified in using force that 
would cause death or serious bodily injury 
against another shall be determined from 
the viewpoint of a reasonable person under 
the then existing circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-402(1) (Supp. 1991) provides that, 
in order to successfully assert a claim of self-defense, a 
defendant must -reasonably believef] that such force is 
necessary to defend [herself] . . . against such other's 
imminent use of unlawful force." We have previously stated 
that reasonable in the context of section 76-2-402(1) means 
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-objectively reasonable.- State v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 985 
(Utah App. 1989) (quoting In re R.J.Z., 736 P.2d 235, 236 (Utah 
1987)). This instruction plainly complies with the objective 
standard requirement; therefore, the trial court did not err in 
giving the said instruction. 
Secondly, Sherard argues that the mutual combat^ 
instruction that was given was irrelevant and confusing. The 
instruction in question, Jury Instruction Number 18, provides: 
If you find that either party was a 
party to mutual combat, or other consensual 
altercation, and that during the course of 
the combat or altercation, either party 
used a deadly weapon, then you must not 
consider the consent of the victim in the 
encounter as a defense to the crime of 
Criminal Homicide. 
Almost every account of the fight between Sherard and 
Kelly indicates that it was, indeed, mutual combat. It was 
therefore entirely appropriate for the trial court to clarify 
by means of instruction that even if Kelly had mutually agreed 
to fight Sherard, this did not excuse Sherard*s use of a deadly 
weapon in that fight. This is true, even if Kelly is viewed as 
the initial aggressor. See state v. Starks, 627 P.2d 88, 90 
(Utah 1981) and cases cited therein. Since the precise wording 
of jury instructions is left to the sound discretion of the 
trial court, Lopez. 789 P.2d at 45, we hold that it was proper 
for the trial court to give the mutual combat instruction in 
question. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, we hold that: (1) the evidence presented 
at trial was sufficient to sustain Sherard's conviction for 
murder in the second degree; (2) The trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in limiting the voir dire of the prospective 
jurors; (3) the trial court properly denied defendant's request 
for a jury instruction on negligent homicide; and (4) the trial 
court did not err in instructing the jury on self-defense and 
mutual combat. Accordingly, we affirm. 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Judith M. Billings, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Venus Ann Sherard, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Case No. 890383-CA 
THIS MATTER having come before the Court upon appellant's 
Petition for Rehearing, filed September 30, 1991, and 
appellee's Response to Petition for Rehearing, filed 
October 24, 1991, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appellant's Petition for 
Rehearing is denied. 
Dated t h i s P day of December, 1991. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Clerk\fof ' ' the Court 
